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I. INTRODUCTION
Twentieth-century eyes have long read the Fourteenth Amendment as
though it were addressed to the judiciary. The historical fact that the
Supreme Court, and not Congress, has taken the lead in defining our
constitutional liberties has left lawyers looking to the courts to fulfill the
promises that lie at the amendment's core. Whether the amendment
prevents a state from operating race-segregated schools, proscribing adult
sexual activity, or sponsoring affirmative action has been seen first and
often exclusively as a question for the courts. Constitutional scholars have
likewise embraced such a judicial reading in their longstanding debate over
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.'
Academics have searched for the original intent of the amendment's
Framers, all the while sharing the assumption that such a theory of judicial
interpretation would lead to a satisfactory conclusion.
City of Boerne v. Flores2 adopted the judicial reading in striking down
Congress's attempt to provide its own content to the open guarantees of the
1. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND REcONSTRUCTION
(1998); RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989);
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Charles Fairman. Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Righis?. 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
2. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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amendment. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)3 with the almost unanimous support of both houses,4
employing its own power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
religious liberty against state infringement.5 The act took aim at the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,6 which had
read the First Amendment to provide no free exercise exemption from
neutral laws of general applicability.7 By restoring the balancing test that
the Court had employed prior to Smith,8 Congress asserted an independent
authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.9 If the legislature
determined that state action threatened the liberty interests guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, it could enact laws to protect that right-even
if the Supreme Court had decided the Fourteenth Amendment would not
compel such a reading. The Boerne Court rejected that interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, finding that "[]egislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause." 10 The Court examined the legislative debates on the amendment
and found that the Framers understood Congress's power to be "remedial,"
limited to implementing legislation that directly or indirectly enforced
judicially defined rights against state interference." To allow Congress to
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
4. The House of Representatives passed RFRA unanimously. See 139 CONG. REC. 27,241
(1993). The Senate passed it by a vote of 97 to three. See id. at 26,416.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 13 (1993)
(asserting power under Section 5 and the Necessary and Proper Clause); H. R. REP. No. 103-88,
at 9 (1993) (same).
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. See id. at 879 (finding that the Free Exercise Clause "does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability"' (citation omitted)).
8. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (finding that "a State's interest in
universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when
it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(requiring that "any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion... be justified
by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
to regulate"' (citation omitted)).
9. RFRA's stated purpose was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened ...." 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b)(1) (1994). Prior to the Smith decision, the Supreme Court had at times applied the
Sherbert test to require that "governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
10. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
11. See id. at 520 ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the remedial, rather than
substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause."). The Boerne Court also grounded the remedial
interpretation in the Court's precedent. See id. at 524-29. Although this Note will confine itself
largely to addressing Boerne's historical argument, a number of commentators have read the case
law quite differently. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a
Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 601, 610-14 (1998); Robert Hoff,
Losing Our Religion: The Constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 377 (1998); Matt Pawa, Note, When
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enforce an interpretation different from that of the judiciary would be to
grant the legislature the substantive power to define constitutional meaning.
As RFRA did not seek to protect such a judicially defined right, it went
beyond Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment and, as such,
reflected an impermissible attempt by the national government to regulate
the states.
The problem with Boerne is not simply that it misread the ratification
history but that it ignored the broader context that gave meaning to those
debates. This Note argues that the Boerne Court, like many modem
constitutional scholars, went astray in focusing upon the judicial branch as
the ultimate interpreter of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court
may retain the last word, the judicial reading obscures the Framers'
conviction that it would be Congress, and not the courts, that would be the
first reader, and primary enforcer, of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
amendment speaks in open generalities not because the Framers naively
believed the judiciary might ascertain a definite meaning behind those
words, but because they were interested in granting to the national
government broad discretion to protect civil liberties against state
infringement. Rather than seeking to codify a definite set of rights, the
Framers undertook to grant future Congresses the discretion to protect civil
liberties, as they might understand them, against state infringement. 3
This Note revisits the legislative reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
by articulating the theory of legislative discretion implicit within the text of
the amendment. The Framers of the amendment, as well as judges and
commentators of the era, expected courts to review acts of Congress under
the deferential standard laid out by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland.4 The amendment grants Congress the power to enforce its
provisions by "appropriate" legislation, a word that called to their minds
the Chief Justice's canonical opinion. In upholding Congress's power to
charter a national bank, Marshall laid out the text through which nineteenth-
century courts would review the constitutionality of an act of Congress:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1993).
12. The search for original intent remains important for judicial enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, of course. However, scholars' emphasis on judicial enforcement has
encouraged them to presume definite answers that may not exist in the ratification history. But see
AMAR, supra note 1, at 175 n.* (arguing for the judicial basis of incorporation but recognizing in
a footnote that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have employed general language
because "many congressional architects of Reconstruction envisioned not only judicial
enforcement of section I but also-and perhaps more centrally-congressional enforcement").
13. Of course, as will be discussed below, the Court retains the ultimate authority to constrain
Congress from extending the Fourteenth Amendment beyond any plausible reading of its text, and
more importantly, to prevent Congress from impermissibly narrowing the amendment's scope.
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." '" Congressmen, judges, and legal
commentators regularly drew on these words-often verbatim-as setting
the standard by which courts would review an act of Congress. 6 In drafting
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republicans borrowed
explicitly from McCulloch in granting Congress the power to enforce the
provisions of the amendment by appropriate legislation. 7
Under the McCulloch standard, Congress enjoyed interpretive
discretion that extended not only to the means but also to the constitutional
ends themselves. Modern commentators have read John Marshall's
reminder that "it is a constitution we are expounding" 1s as a warrant for
judicial license.' However, in McCulloch, those words licensed not judicial
freedom, but judicial deference to the plausible interpretive acts of
Congress. To take McCulloch seriously is to understand why the Supreme
Court, after Marbury v. Madison,20 struck down only one other act of
Congress prior to the Civil War.2' In contrast to Boerne's neat but
implausible distinction between the power to remedy and the power to
define constitutional violations, McCulloch recognized that congressional
legislation would inevitably shape constitutional meaning.
The McCulloch theory rests upon three propositions. First, a
constitution designates only the broad outlines of its important objects.22
Second, the public welfare requires Congress to have wide latitude in
choosing the means by which it is to pursue such objects.23 And third, a
court will only strike down an act of Congress if there is a clear opposition
15. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Section III.B.
18. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
19. See Alex Kozinski & J.D. Williams, It Is a Constitution We Are Expounding: A Debate.
1987 UTAH L. REV. 977 (debating whether judges should read McCulloch as a license). Philip
Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "To Say What
the Law Is," 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 581, 591 (1981) (arguing that whenever a judge quotes the
McCulloch language, "you can be sure that the Court will be throwing the constitutional text, its
history, and its structure to the winds in reaching its conclusion").
20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. The Dred Scott case struck down the provision of the Missouri Compromise that
prohibited slavery from existing in Illinois. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
452 (1856). The Court did not, of course, accord the same deference to state laws that it did to the
acts of its coordinate legislative branch. The McCulloch case, striking down Maryland's tax on the
national bank, is but one example among many.
22. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (finding that a constitution's nature requires
"that only its great outlines should be marked").
23. See id. at 421 (" T]he sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be
carried into execution ....").
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between the constitutional text and the law.24 If these principles are
accepted, then Boerne's claim that Congress has no independent discretion
in reading the text cannot be correct. Where the Constitution's text speaks
in terms of broad principles, Congress may legislate under those broad
terms. And a court may deny that action only when the law cannot be
reconciled with the constitutional text. Under McCulloch, Congress's
discretion goes well beyond the mere ability to select the means to
judicially defined ends. At least that is what the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood McCulloch to mean.
The Reconstruction Congress demonstrated its understanding in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, just weeks before it considered
Section 5. The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment-the
textual predecessor of Section 5-granted Congress the power to enforce
the amendment's substantive guarantees against slavery by "appropriate
legislation." ' The substance of the amendment prohibited slavery, yet
under the Enforcement Clause the Republicans claimed the authority to
enact the Civil Rights Act, which protected against state infringement a
range of civil liberties, such as the rights of contract and property and the
right to sue in court. To justify such power, congressional Republicans
invoked "the celebrated case of McCulloch vs. The State of Maryland" as
allowing Congress to read the amendment not simply to prohibit slavery,
but to guarantee the "maintenance of freedom to the citizen."2 6 The
legislators who passed the Civil Rights Act introduced this same view into
the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 They recognized that the privileges and
immunities "are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature," yet the Republicans would rely upon Congress's power "to
pass laws which are appropriate to the attainment of the great object of the
24. See id. ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."); see also Fletcher v. Peck.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C-.) ("The opposition between the Constitution and
the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility
with each other.").
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIIL § 2.
26. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747, 825 n.299 (1999) (discussing the link
between congressional discretion under Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that while Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
slavery, Section 2 grants Congress the power to prohibit the "badges and incidents" of slavery.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
27. Indeed, the breadth of such understanding led many legislators to remark that in light of
the Thirteenth Amendment, the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment addressed to civil liberty
were unnecessary. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Thayer). But see id. at 2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (arguing that the self-executing provision
of Section 1 was necessary to ensure that a majority in Congress could not repeal the Civil Rights
Act).
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amendment. '28 So long as Congress pursued an end plausibly within the
Constitution, and did so by means not prohibited, the Court would sustain
legislative interpretations of the act.
The Reconstruction Court invoked this tradition in interpreting
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its first
construction of that clause, in Ex parte Virginia,29 the Court described
Congress's power in words that tracked McCulloch: "Whatever legislation
is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have
in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain... if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional
power."3" Although that language lay dormant for nearly a century, the
Court of the civil rights era revived it during the voting rights cases of the
1960s, according Congress substantial discretion to go beyond the Court's
reading of the Civil War amendments in order to protect civil liberties.3
The Boerne Court itself honored the McCulloch reading, quoting Ex parte
Virginia" at the beginning of its inquiry and devoting a section of the
opinion to affirming its consonance with the voting rights precedents.33 But
the Court honored McCulloch more in the breach than in the observance.
While McCulloch may remain in name the standard by which the Court
reviews congressional acts under the Fourteenth Amendment, Boerne's
holding casts the law away from those constitutional moorings.
Although numerous modern commentators have recognized McCulloch
as the appropriate standard for the interpretation of Section 5 legislation,
none has looked closely at what that theory meant to the Framers of the
amendment. 34 This Note seeks to remedy that defect by articulating the
28. Id. at 2765-66 (statement of Sen. Howard) (emphasis added).
29. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
30. Id. at 345-46.
31. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (" Ihe McCulloch v. Maryland
standard is the measure of what constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (quoting Ex Parte
Virginia and describing the McCulloch language as the "classic formulation" of congressional
power).
32. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46).
Ironically, the Boerne Court also cited McCulloch at the beginning of its legal analysis, albeit for
the proposition that "[u]nder our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated
powers." Id. at 516.
33. See id. at 526-529.
34. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right:
Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 811-12 (acknowledging
the tension between Marbury and McCulloch in the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence); Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, I ll HARV. L.
REv. 153, 185-88 (1997) (finding the McCulloch standard to require the "presumption of
constitutionality"); Pawa, supra note 11, at 1059 (noting that "the Court rarely accepts
congressional power to prohibit conduct that does not itself violate the Constitution"); Rachel
Toker, Note, Tying the Hands of Congress: City of Boerne v. Flores, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
273, 276-78, 286-87 (1998) (examining the McCulloch standard against voting rights precedent).
Two other scholars have recognized that Congress's broad discretion under the Thirteenth
[Vol. 109: 115
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McCulloch theory of judicial review implicit in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II argues that Boerne's historical analysis provides an
unsatisfactory account of the original understanding of Section 5. The
Boerne Court limited its inquiry to the legislative debates and found that the
rejection of an earlier version of the amendment signaled a strong desire to
limit Congress's discretion in shaping constitutional meaning.' This Part
argues that the alterations in the text invited judicial enforcement and
introduced the "state action" requirement but did not change Congress's
ability to provide plausible substance to those guarantees. The Fourteenth
Amendment remained a grant of power to Congress, the scope of which
must be determined in light of McCulloch v. Maryland.
Part mH explores how the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood the McCulloch theory of judicial review. From its issuance,
commentators and judges looked to the case for guidance in reviewing acts
of Congress. Judges cited it frequently, and each time they found that it
confirmed Congress's assertion of power. Section III.A explores the
"original understanding" of McCulloch, looking first to the case itself and
then to the work of its earliest interpreters. The great constitutional treatises
of the early nineteenth century by Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor
James Kent read McCulloch as the authoritative text on congressional
power. The Supreme Court relied upon it throughout the antebellum era,
and by the 1860s, judges recognized McCulloch as the definitive and
canonical exposition of congressional power.
The Reconstruction Congress would invoke these works, and the
McCulloch decision itself, in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment. Section
II.B returns to the congressional debates themselves to show how the
McCulloch theory of congressional power found its way into the text. The
drafters of the amendment drew on McCulloch and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as precedents for the discretion later Congresses would enjoy under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Both within Congress and before the states, the
ratification debates read the Fourteenth Amendment as primarily a grant of
power to Congress to legislate under McCulloch. Section III.C shows how
the Supreme Court brought this same understanding to its early
Amendment calls into question Boerne's narrow reading of the Fourteenth. See Amar, supra note
26, at 822-25; William G. Buss, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 391. 417-18 (1998).
35. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24. In limiting its inquiry to the historical debates, the
Boerne Court was not alone. Few of the scholars who have considered historical evidence in
arguing for or against the constitutionality of RFRA have gone beyond a narrow reading of the
ratification debates. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress.
Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1577-88 (1995);
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 608- 10; Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings:
A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 69 S. CAL L. REV. 589, 626-42 (1996). For
some exceptions, see Amar, supra note 26, at 822-25; Lupu. supra note 34. at 810-12; and
McConnell, supra note 34, at 185-88.
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Against the background of the
Reconstruction Court's struggle to balance constitutional innovation with
the federal structure, two themes emerge: The Fourteenth Amendment was
a story about congressional power, and Congress would enjoy substantial
interpretive discretion in legislating that content.
Part IV concludes by briefly examining the issues raised by the
McCulloch theory outlined in this Note. Even if the argument from original
understanding is convincing, is such a vision of judicial deference to
congressional action desirable? This Part argues that allowing both the
judiciary and the legislature to compete with the states in expanding the
zone of liberty reflects the best traditions of our constitutional government
and might increase the democratic legitimacy of "substantive due process."
Rather than threatening the federalist balance, granting Congress an
increased role in protecting national liberties holds true to a federalism that
recognizes a national government of enumerated and limited powers.
II. BOERNE, BINGHAM, AND THE TEXT OF THE AMENDMENT
City of Boerne v. Flores was a zoning dispute that became a vehicle for
a constitutional challenge. The case arose as a controversy between city and
church authorities over plans to enlarge a Catholic church that the city had
designated a historic landmark. After the city denied the building permit,
the church sued in federal district court, alleging a RFRA violation, among
other claims. On a motion to dismiss, the district court found RFRA
unconstitutional and certified the issue to the higher courts.36 The Supreme
Court thus granted certiorari solely on the question of whether RFRA lay
within Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court concluded that it did not. Section 5 granted Congress the
power to "enforce" the "provisions of this article." 37 That power, in the
Court's eyes, was either "remedial" or "substantive." If it was remedial,
then Congress's power was limited to remedying or preventing violations of
rights that were recognized by the courts. But if not remedial, the power
could only be substantive, allowing Congress to alter constitutional
meaning. However, "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
36. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995). rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352
(5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
37. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 ("In assessing the breadth of § 5's enforcement power, we
begin with its text. Congress has been given the power 'to enforce' the 'provisions of this
article."'). But see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). By omitting the crucial words, "by
appropriate legislation," the Court directed its inquiry to who defines the "provisions of this
article" rather than the scope of Congress's power to pass "appropriate" legislation. As this Note
argues, this word, "appropriate," the Framers' link to the McCulloch understanding of judicial
review, is necessary for interpreting the constitutional text.
[Vol. 109: 115
The McCulloch Theory
changing what the right is." 3 The Court adopted the remedial view and
then drew upon the ratification history and its own precedent for support.
As RFRA neither remedied nor prevented the violation of the religious
liberty recognized by Employment Division v. Smith, it exceeded
Congress's Section 5 power.
It is Boerne's treatment of the ratification history that is the concern of
this Part. Boerne's historical argument rested almost entirely upon the
rejection of Representative John Bingham's first draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment. According to the Boerne Court, "The objections to the
Committee's first draft of the Amendment, and the rejection of the draft,
have a direct bearing on the central issue of defining Congress'
enforcement power."39 The first draft gave Congress "primary power to
interpret and elaborate on the meaning" 40 of the amendment, which in the
Court's view amounted to substantive enforcement powers. The opposition
the draft faced and its replacement with the text that was ultimately adopted
suggested to the Boerne Court that Congress had endorsed a "remedial"
version of the amendment, one that took the power to read the amendment
out of the hands of Congress and turned it over to the Court.' As this Part
argues, the ratification history that Boerne considers provides scant support
for such a reading. Although the changes in the text address significant
interpretive issues, they do not limit--or enhance-Congress's discretion in
the exercise of power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Text of the First Draft
On February 13, 1866, Representative John Bingham, a leading
Republican from Ohio,42 presented to the House of Representatives a draft
amendment on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and to
38. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
39. Id. at 520.
40. Id. at 524.
41. See id. at 520-24.
42. Representative John Bingham was a Republican moderate and a member of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction. His leading role in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment has made
him the protagonist-or the target-of several studies on the original understanding of the text.
See, e.g., RAOuL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 136-45 (1977); CURTIS. stipra note 1, at
120-26; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment. 103
YALE LJ. 57 (1993); Fairman, supra note 1. at 25-26.
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all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.43
Bingham's draft embodied an express grant of power to Congress to
enforce the constitutional liberties that the antislavery Republicans believed
had been denied in the slaveholding South prior to the Civil War and were
again being denied to freed blacks and their white political allies in the
South. 44 To Republican eyes, the amendment would grant the national
government the powers that had been withheld-either by the states'
jealousy of national power at the Founding or by subsequent
misinterpretation by the courts-to enforce the obligations of the
Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.45
The first phrase of the text announced that the amendment would add to
the catalogue of Congress's enumerated powers. Echoing the text of Article
I, Section 8, which lists the powers of Congress, the amendment provided,
"The Congress shall have power ..... " It then borrowed verbatim from the
Necessary and Proper Clause46 to ensure that the grant of power would
include the implied powers arising under that clause. Substantively, the
amendment granted Congress the power to enforce the two constitutional
provisions that the Republicans believed provided the essential guarantees
of civil liberty: the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fifth
Amendment.
Although these textual provisions were self-executing, no express grant
of power to Congress provided for their enforcement. Many Republicans
believed the Bill of Rights and the Privileges and Immunities Clause bound
the states, but the federal judiciary had rejected such a reading, and
Congress so far had been powerless to enforce those guarantees.48 As
Bingham said on the House floor, "[I]t has been the want of the Republic
that there was not an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable
the whole people of every State, by congressional enactment, to enforce
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
44. A number of legal historians have emphasized the "antislavery origins" of the
Republicans' concern for civil liberty. See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 105-08 (1951); see also CURTIS. supra note I. at 6-7.
36-40 (discussing antislavery legal theory).
45. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 145-48 (discussing competing antebellum theories of the Bill
of Rights).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
47. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1062 (1866) (statement of Rep. Kelley)
("This amendment, will, in my judgment, but reinvigorate a dormant power .. "); see also
CURTIS, supra note 1, at 48 (" Republicans who expressed their view on the subject rejected the
ruling in Barron v. Baltimore that the guaranties of the Bill of Rights did not limit the states."
(footnote omitted)).
48. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861) (reading the Fugitive Slave
Clause as imposing an obligation upon state officials unenforceable by the national government):




obedience to these requirements of the Constitution." '  The new
amendment would expressly grant Congress that power, providing "in
effect that Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate
legislation all the guarantees of the Constitution." -o In presenting this draft,
Bingham believed that this amendment would do nothing more than grant
Congress the power to enforce rights already existing as self-executing
provisions in the Constitution.
Several problems with this reading of the amendment came to light as
the amendment was debated. Chief among these concerns, as the Boerne
Court recognized, was that "[It]he proposed Amendment gave Congress too
much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional
structure." 5' Democrats and some Republicans expressed concern that the
proposed language would grant Congress the power to pass legislation upon
all matters concerning life, liberty, and property in the states. 2 These
concerns reflected two distinct issues. First, most Democrats opposed
granting Congress any control over civil liberties. The Founders had
entrusted such local legislation to the domain of the states. Allowing the
federal government to intrude into the states' domestic affairs ran contrary
to the whole scheme of federalism.53 Under such a view, any version of the
amendment that granted Congress power to enforce constitutional liberties
against the states would prove unpalatable.
Several legislators, however, offered a second and more restricted
critique of the reach of the amendment. These men feared that the equal
protection language of the proposed amendment would grant Congress the
power not merely to protect citizens from discrimination, but to pass
general legislation to make laws equal across the states. Representative
Hale of New York, for instance, argued that the amendment was not merely
a provision "that when the States undertake to give protection which is
unequal Congress may equalize it; it is a grant of power in general
terms. ... " 54 The problem for Hale was not the idea that the federal
government should enforce constitutional guarantees against state
infringement, but that such powers were not limited to cases in which the
states themselves abridged existing constitutional guarantees.
In addition to these concerns about scope, some Republicans criticized
the text for its exclusive dependence on Congress as the protector of
49. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
50. Id. at 586 (statement of Rep. Donnelly).
51. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
52. See id. at 520-21 (citing statements of representatives); see also Michael P. Zuckert.
Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment- The Original Understanding of Section
Five, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 123, 129-31 (1986) (detailing the divisions among Republican
legislators).
53. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1085 (1866) (statement of Rep. Davis).
54. Id. at 1064-65.
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constitutional liberties. Rather than incorporating substantive rights into the
Constitution, the amendment merely granted Congress the power to pass
legislation to protect those rights. However, any legislation taken to secure
those rights could be undone by hostile congressional majorities in the
future. As Representative Hotchkiss argued, "[T]his amendment proposes
to leave it to the caprice of Congress; and your legislation upon the subject
would depend upon the political majority of Congress ... . " While the
Republicans were in control of the government, they should create an
amendment that would entrench constitutional limitations on state action.
In the face of these concerns, Bingham's proposal failed to win the two-
thirds vote required to pass. Instead, the House voted to table the proposal
until April.56 In the meantime, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
began work on a new version of the amendment, one that would appeal to a
wider audience. The new version was reported to Congress on April 30,
1866.
B. The Second Version of the Amendment
The new version of the amendment included a number of significant
changes. Taken as a whole, it had a broader scope. Sections 2, 3, and 4
addressed other problems of Reconstruction.57 Section 1, together with the
Enforcement Clause of Section 5, reflected the concerns of the original
Bingham proposal. Those provisions read:
Section One. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section Five. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.58
Under the new text, the guarantees of the amendment were self-executing
and were limited expressly to constraining state action. The reach of the
enforcement powers, which in the first version had tracked the Necessary
and Proper Clause, now borrowed instead from the second section of the
55. Id. at 1095.
56. See Zuckert, supra note 52, at 131 (examining the meaning of the vote to postpone).
57. Section 2 denied the Southern states additional representation from newly freed slaves
who lacked the right to vote. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Section 3 barred former rebels
from holding federal office. See id. § 3. Section 4 repudiated the Confederate war debt and
precluded former slaveowners from seeking compensation for emancipation. See id. § 4.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2286 (1866). The first sentence of the present
Section 1, defining national citizenship, was added by the Senate. See CURTIS, supra note I. at 89.
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Thirteenth Amendment, allowing Congress to "enforce" the amendment
"by appropriate legislation."
Boerne read those changes as having turned the substantive
Congressional power into a remedial one. 9 This claim indeed amounts to
the heart of Boerne's historical argument. Under the original draft of the
amendment, Congress had the power not only to enforce constitutional
guarantees, but also to dictate their substantive content. By altering the
language to make it self-executing, the new draft restricted Congress to
enforcing substantive constitutional provisions, as interpreted by the Court.
The Boerne Court did not say precisely which changes led from the
"substantive" to the "remedial" reading of the amendment, but it
emphasized that the new amendment created "self-executing limits on the
States" and quoted the new language of Section 5.' The remedial reading
could arise out of: (1) the self-executing aspect of the final version; (2) the
limitation of the amendment's scope to state action; or (3) the textual
changes to the Enforcement Clause itself.6 None of these amendments to
the text, however, reduces Congress's discretion to interpret for itself the
meaning of the constitutional guarantees that the amendment expressly
grants it the power to enforce.
1. Self-Executing
The new version most obviously differs from the older one in that it is
self-executing. The original Bingham draft was exclusively a grant of
power to Congress. By itself, it placed no new limits on the states; instead,
it authorized Congress to create such limits as would ensure that the
privileges and immunities and equal protection of the citizens would not be
abridged. Those Republicans were concerned that, should their party lose
control of Congress, any civil rights legislation might be repealed. As the
Republican Representative James Garfield, speaking in favor of the revised
version, remarked:
The civil rights bill is now a part of the law of the land. But every
gentleman knows it will cease to be a part of the law whenever the
sad moment arrives when [the Democratic party] comes into power.
It is precisely for that reason that we propose to lift that great and
good law above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the
plots and machinations of any party, and fix it in the serene sky, in
59. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522 ("Under the revised Amendment. Congress' power was no
longer plenary but remedial.").
60. Id.
61. See McConnell, supra note 34, at 178-79 (discussing other alterations between the two
drafts).
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the eternal firmament of the Constitution, where no storm of
passion can shake it and no cloud can obscure it.62
The Republicans made the amendment self-executing in order to enlist the
courts in enforcing those guarantees, even in the absence of congressional
legislation.
Enlisting the judiciary, however, did not of itself restrict congressional
enforcement. Not a single statement in Congress reflected that idea. On the
contrary, the record speaks of enlisting the courts to enforce the amendment
only when Congress failed to act or was unduly restrictive in protecting
constitutional liberties. Supporters and opponents continued to assume that
the amendment would be primarily a grant of power to Congress.
Representative Harding, for instance, spoke against the new bill because "it
transfers to Congress from the States all power of control over their own
citizens."63 Senator Howard, in introducing the revised draft to the Senate,
also expressed his belief that Congress would remain the primary enforcer
of the self-executing amendment:
The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore,
to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to
respect these great fundamental guarantees. How will it be done
under the present amendment? As I have remarked, they are not
powers granted to Congress, and therefore it is necessary, if they
are to be effectuated and enforced, as they assuredly ought to be,
that additional power should be given to Congress to that end. This
is done by the fifth section of this amendment .... 64
Many Republicans regarded congressional enforcement as the only way
in practice to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
courts had already failed to exercise their power to enforce the guarantees
of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fifth Amendment
62. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866); see also id. at 1095 (statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss) (criticizing original draft's dependence upon "caprice of Congress"), id. at 2459
(statement of Rep. Stevens) (recognizing that the amendment would protect the Civil Rights Act
from a hostile congressional majority).
63. Id. at3147.
64. Id. at 2766. Likewise, Representative Eliot read Section 1 to concern Congress's power,
saying, "I support the first section because the doctrine it declares is right, and if, under the
Constitution as it now stands, Congress has not the power ... then, in my judgment, such power
should be distinctly conferred." Id. at 2511. Representative Raymond read Section I as
substantially similar to the original Bingham draft: " [N]ow... it is again proposed so to amend
the Constitution as to confer upon Congress the power to pass [the Civil Rights Act]." Id. at 2502;
see also id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Poland) (reading Section I as a grant of congressional
power); id. at app. 255 (statement of Rep. Baker) (describing the amendments as granting
Congress the power to protect liberty).
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against the states.'s However, none of those politicians, such as
Representative Garfield, who sought to enlist support for judicial
enforcement, suggested that the changes would reduce the legislative role in
protecting civil rights.
The Boerne Court, however, read the alterations to restrict Congress's
power under the amendment. 66 Under the old language, Congress had the
substantive power to define the constitutional limitations it was to secure.
Now it was limited to "the power to make the substantive constitutional
prohibitions against the States effective."'67 But this does not follow from
the text. Under the original version, the Court would retain its role in
deciding whether Congress had enacted a law within the scope of its
enumerated power. In fact, given the Bingham draft's express textual
references to the existing Constitution, one might infer that the Republicans
were consciously restricting the scope of Congress's new power to the
existing judicial interpretation of those obligations. Bingham's proposal did
not expressly grant Congress any new discretion to define these old terms.
Instead, it granted Congress the power to enforce against the states
limitations that were expressly referenced by other provisions of the text.
If Congress passed a law under the original draft, the Supreme Court
would still have to ask, was Congress enacting a law to secure "privileges
and immunities" or the "equal protection" in the enjoyment of civil rights?
Suppose, for instance, that Congress enacted a law, pursuant to its power
under the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down a state law that prohibited
African-Americans from voting. According to Bingham and other
Republicans, the right to vote was not guaranteed by either the "privilege
and immunity" or the "equal protection" prongs of the Fourteenth
Amendment.s If Congress nevertheless passed the law, there is nothing in
either the original or final versions of the text to suggest that the Supreme
Court would be unwilling to strike it down.
Under the original version of the amendment, the Court would ask, has
Congress passed a law appropriate to securing a "privilege or immunity" or
to ensuring "equal protection" in the rights of life, liberty, and property?
Precisely the same question would arise under the final version. There the
Court would ask, has Congress passed a law to remedy a state's
abridgement of a "privilege or immunity," a denial of equal protection, or a
deprivation of due process? Because the state has acted, the Court would
65. See, e.g., i. at 1054 (statement of Rep. Higby) (supporting the amendment for giving
"vitality and life" to limitations against the states that "have received such a construction that
they have been entirely ignored and have become as dead matter in that instrument"); id. at 1062
(statement of Rep. Kelley) (criticizing "all that has been done judicially in furtherance of this
great wrong" of slavery).
66. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522-23.
67. 1d. at 522.
68. See infra text accompanying note 150.
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still determine whether the state's action restricted a liberty within the
meaning of the text. Nothing in the text suggests that Congress's power was
any more substantive under the first version of the amendment than under
the second. While the self-executing language permits the Court to interpret
the language prior to legislative action, that fact cannot, of itself, suggest
that the Court should apply a new standard for evaluating an act of
Congress. Indeed, the history shows that the Framers believed the judiciary
would apply the same standard.69
2. State Action
In one sense, though, the new draft was "remedial." The original draft
of the amendment granted Congress broad powers to regulate local activity.
The national legislature could pass any laws that might, in its discretion,
secure freedom and equality in the enjoyment of constitutional rights.
Under the new draft, Congress could pass only legislation to remedy state
violations of those rights; it could not pass general legislation that did not
address itself to state violations.7" The Boerne Court placed great weight on
this fact. Indeed, the opinion included several quotations from Republican
leaders to the effect that the amendment now targeted unjust state action
rather than allowing Congress simply to guarantee civil liberty.7 Likewise,
the opinion quoted suggestively from a later debate in the House in which
Representative Garfield stated, "[W]e cannot, by any reasonable
interpretation, give to [§ 5] ... the force and effect of the rejected
[Bingham] clause." 72 Garfield's argument, like the statements in the
ratification debates, spoke precisely to the state action principle. The
revised version, unlike the previous one, limited Congress's (and the
Court's) power to remedying unconstitutional state action. In this sense, the
69. See infra Part III.
70. This state action reading remains the simplest reading of the text. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-19 (1883); McConnell, supra note 34, at 179. Still, John Bingham and later
commentators have argued that the change in language was merely cosmetic. See CONG. GLOBE.
42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham); CURTIS, supra note 1, at 161-
62; TENBROEK, supra note 44, at 200-05. In debating the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Bingham
stated that he introduced the "No State shall" language in order to follow Chief Justice Marshall's
guidance in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In Barron, Chief Justice Marshall
held that the Bill of Rights was not meant to place limits on the states, since if "the framers of
these amendments intended them to be limitations on the power of the State governments, they
would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that intention."
Id. at 250. Bingham argued that he revised the amendment accordingly so that its prohibition on
the states would echo the constitutional limitations in the original constitutional text. See CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871).
71. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522-23 (quoting Reps. Bingham and Stevens and Sen. Howard).
72. Id. at 523 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong.. 1st Sess., app. 151 (1871) (second and
third alterations in original)).
[Vol. 109:i115
The McCulloch Theory
changes in the amendment ensured that Congress's enforcement powers
would be remedial.
Nevertheless, this definition of remedial does not speak to the issue in
Boerne: Does Congress have the discretion to interpret what constitutes a
violation of those rights? Boerne argued that by limiting Congress to
remedying unconstitutional state action, the new draft necessarily assumed
that there must be some external standard, provided by the courts, that
would measure whether a constitutional violation had occurred. But as this
Note argued earlier, the courts would have had the same responsibility to
apply such an external standard under the original Bingham proposal.
There, they would have been obliged to determine whether Congress was
acting to secure a constitutional guarantee within the meaning of the text.
Thus, the state action requirement does not speak to how a court should
determine whether Congress has exceeded its power to enforce the
amendment.
3. The Text of the Enforcement Clause
Might the changes in the description of Congress's enforcement powers
have been intended to limit its discretion? Under the original version,
Congress had the power to pass all laws "necessary and proper" to secure
the stated goals. Under the final version, that power was limited to a
conceivably more modest role in "enforc[ing] the provisions of this article
by appropriate legislation."73 Such a change in text might signal a desire to
limit legislative discretion under the amendment. As the Boerne Court
asserted, "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing
what the right is." 74 Did the shift from "secure" to "enforce" and from
"necessary and proper" to "appropriate" suggest a narrowing of
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment?
Again, the historical record weighs heavily against such a
consideration. The text of Section 5 arises directly from the Enforcement
Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. 75 The debates over the Thirteenth
Amendment do not explain why Congress chose the phrase "appropriate"
instead of "necessary and proper," but the word was clearly chosen with
the Supreme Court's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland in mind.76 There,
Chief Justice Marshall read the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
74. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
75. See supra text accompanying note 15.
76. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); Amar,
supra note 26, at 823-25; see also United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785. 791 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866)
(No. 16,151) ("In McCullough v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall used the phrase 'appropriate'
as the equivalent and exponent of 'necessary and proper' in the preceding paragraph." (citation
omitted)).
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Congress the power to employ "all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted" to an end within the scope of the Constitution.77
Congress's power to enforce the ends of the amendment by "appropriate
legislation" thus invoked the contemporary understanding of "necessary
and proper." 
78
Legislators in the debates used the terms "appropriate" and "necessary
and proper" interchangeably. Congressman Donnelly, for instance, read
"necessary and proper" in the original draft to provide "in effect that
Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation all the
guarantees of the Constitution."79 Likewise, Senator Howard presented the
bill to the Senate by finding that it brought the power to enforce the
Constitution's guarantees "within the sweeping clause of the Constitution
authorizing Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper." 80
Similarly, there does not appear to be any relevant distinction between
the amendment's grant of the power to "secure" and the power to
"enforce." John Bingham referred to the original proposal as granting
Congress "the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the
Constitution today." 8 Representative Raymond found the final version of
the amendment to provide for "securing an equality of rights to all
citizens." 82 The changes in the enforcement language of the amendment
thus do not appear to have reflected any inclination to change the scope of
Congress's power under the amendment. It seems more likely that once
Congress decided to make the Fourteenth Amendment self-executing, the
drafters deliberately phrased the Enforcement Clause to echo that of the
Thirteenth.
The way in which many Republicans understood Congress's power
under the Thirteenth Amendment weighs conclusively against any
suggestion that the new Enforcement Clause narrowed Congress's power.
This point will be argued in greater detail in Section Ill.B, but it should be
sufficient to touch upon it here. In the months during which Congress
debated both versions of the Fourteenth Amendment, it also passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which declared the freed slaves to be citizens and
77. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819) (emphasis added).
78. Judges would also accept that "appropriate" referred to "necessary and proper." See Ev
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (paraphrasing McCulloch in describing the extent of
congressional power under Section 5); Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 791 (describing McCudloch a; the
source of the Thirteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 586 (1866) (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 2765-66.
81. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1034 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (" [11f the
grant of power had been originally conferred upon the Congress of the nation, and legislation had
been upon your statute-books to enforce these requirements of the Constitution in every state, that
rebellion, which has scarred and blasted this land, would have been an impossibility." (emphasis
added)).
82. Id. at 2502.
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protected them against discriminatory state action. Although Bingham
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary in order to grant
Congress the power to enact the Civil Rights Act, he was among the
minority in his party. 3 Most Republicans believed that the Constitution
already gave Congress that power, and in both houses of Congress, they
cited the Thirteenth Amendment for support."
To the Republicans, the power to pass "appropriate" legislation to
enforce the amendment's prohibition on slavery carried with it, under the
McCulloch standard, the broad powers to effect the general objects of the
amendment. Senator Trumbull, for instance, found that the adoption of the
Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power "to protect every
person in the United States in all the rights of person and property
belonging to a free citizen." 85 Senator Sherman stated that the amendment
not only guaranteed liberty, but included
an express grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty by
appropriate legislation. Now, unless a man may be free without the
right to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded, [etc.] ... then
Congress has the power, by the express terms of this amendment, to
secure all these rights. 6
The broad manner in which such Republicans understood Congress's power
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by "appropriate" legislation militates
against the claim that the same text in the Fourteenth Amendment limited
congressional discretion.
In sum, the Boerne Court's reading of the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not hold up under scrutiny. The alterations to
the original Bingham version speak to the issues of state action and judicial
enforcement, but they do not provide any support for a narrowing of
Congress's power to enforce the amendment's constitutional guarantees.
That does not necessarily imply the "substantive" theory of the amendment
that Boerne posed as an alternative, but it does point to the need for a more
satisfactory understanding of Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. That answer, as this Note has suggested, lies in the
contemporary understanding of "appropriate" powers and requires a
83. See id. at 1291 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
84. In addition to the Thirteenth Amendment, Republicans relied upon their interpretation of
the Bill of Rights and Article IV, Section 2. See CURTIs, supra note I, at 80-83.
85. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865).
86. Id. at 41; see also id. (statement of Sen. Wilson) ("I believe that the constitutional
amendment has been adopted, and that under the second section of that amendment we have the
power to pass [the bill]."); id. at 43 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("[The Enforcement Clause]
was inserted expressly for the purpose of conferring upon Congress authority by appropriate
legislation to carry the first section into effect. ... What that 'appropriate legislation' is. is for
Congress to determine, and nobody else.").
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broader inquiry into the significance of McCulloch v. Maryland for the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. THE MCCULLOCH THEORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Calling McCulloch v. Maryland a landmark decision is a bit like calling
Michael Jordan a basketball all-star. The subject describes the label better
than the label describes the subject.87 Of the many interesting themes raised
by the case-the process of constitutional interpretation, the notion of
implied powers, and, of course, federalism-one of the more neglected is
that of separation of powers. For the issue of judicial review was just as
critical to McCulloch as it was to Marbury. While Marbury established the
power of judicial review over federal laws, it was McCulloch that told
nineteenth-century judges how they were to go about that job. McCulloch
told them that the Court would give Congress substantial deference in its
assertion of powers "appropriate" to a defined constitutional end. And it
was with this conception that the Framers drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This Part explores the meaning of the McCulloch tradition for the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section III.A looks at the opinion
itself and then traces its rapid ascent into the canons of constitutional law.
Nineteenth-century legal scholars understood judicial review of federal
actions against the deferential standard of McCulloch. Section III.B argues
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated this tradition
into the text of the amendment. Section III.C shows how the Reconstruction
Court's interpretation of the amendment likewise continued the tradition of
judicial deference that began with McCulloch v. Maryland.
A. The Original Understanding of McCulloch
The facts in McCulloch are familiar. In order to help the federal
government shoulder wartime national debt, Congress chartered the Second
Bank of the United States in 1816. The Bank, always a tempting target for
enemies of finance, national power, or local competition, soon found itself
87. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Lxw, Il1 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 973 (1998) ("At least within the field of constitutional law, almost everyone seems to
agree that McCulloch is canonical."); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998) ("No one, I suspect, would be surprised to learn that
Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Brown v. Board of Education appear in every
major constitutional law casebook now on the market." (footnotes omitted)). Balkin and Levinson
cite one study that recognized McCulloch as one of ten cases included in every constitutional law
casebook. See Balkin & Levinson, supra, at 974 n.43 (citing Jerry Goldman, Is There a Canon of
Constitutional Law?, AM. POL. SCI. ASS'N NEWSL., Spring 1993, at 2, 2-4).
[Vol. 109: 115
The McCulloch Theory
faced with discriminatory taxes in a number of states, including Maryland.s
James McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch, refused to pay, and the
State brought suit to claim $15,000 in taxes.' The litigation raised in the
first place the interesting but relatively minor question of whether a state
could tax a corporation chartered by the federal government. But in
claiming the right to tax, Maryland also challenged Congress's power to
charter the Bank. Turning to that issue first, Marshall went beyond the
confines of the case to elucidate his theory of federalism, the scope of
implied powers, and the manner in which the judiciary is to review an act of
Congress.
Marshall began his analysis by examining the nature of the federal
government. The national government draws its power directly from the
ratification of the sovereign people and so does not depend upon the states
for its existence. The government is one of enumerated powers, supreme
within its sphere of action, but its powers are limited to those objects
designated by the Constitution. There is no enumerated power providing for
the establishment of a bank; however, the Constitution does not "partake of
the prolixity of a legal code." 90 Instead, the Constitution marks those "great
outlines" and designates "those important objects" from which those
"minor ingredients which compose those objects [may] be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves." 9' In construing the scope of those
powers, "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding."92 As such, the Constitution delimits its ends at a high level of
generality. In order to effectuate them, Congress must have the implied
power to enact the means conducive to those ends.
These implied powers must not only be presumed, but they are
explicitly granted by the text itself, which provides Congress with the
power to make "all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution .... 93 Maryland argued for a construction of "necessary and
proper" that would limit Congress's discretion to those means "without
which the power given would be nugatory."' But Marshall, arguing from
88. The Second Bank bore some of the responsibility for the animosity it created. Reckless
management of its credit had contributed to the ruin of a number of state banks. See I CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 505 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987)
(1926).
89. See Gerald Gunther, Introduction to JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 1, 3-4 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
90. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.407 (1819).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
94. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. Thomas Jefferson had argued against the
constitutionality of the first national bank on similar lines. See Thomas Jefferson. Opinion on the
Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank. in 19 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 275, 278-80 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
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text, history, and structure, recognized the phrase to express Congress's
power "to adopt any [means] which might be appropriate, and which were
conducive" to the ends designated by the Constitution.95
Under such a principle of construction, Marshall found that Congress
had frequently exercised powers that were neither expressly granted nor
strictly necessary, but instead were conducive to the achievement of other
ends. For instance, Congress had required that various federal officers
swear oaths of loyalty. Such oaths were not strictly necessary to the
government's power, nor was that power provided for in the Constitution."
Still, "he would be charged with insanity" who suggested that it was
outside the legislature's discretion to exact such a security for faithful
performance. 97 Likewise, Marshall found it incontrovertible that Congress
may punish the violation of any of its laws, even though the text expressly
granted the power to punish only certain crimes, such as counterfeiting or
piracy. The power to establish post offices and federal courts implied that
Congress had the power to punish mail theft or perjury. Marshall found that
past practice had uniformly construed the Necessary and Proper Clause
broadly.
Turning to the language that would resound throughout American
jurisprudence, Marshall explained how a court is to construe Congress's
implied powers:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are
limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think
the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.98
These words, the McCulloch standard, invite substantial deference to
Congress's choice of means in the pursuit of ends recognized by the
Constitution. As the Constitution marks only the "great outlines" of those
ends, Congress has substantial discretion, in undertaking the means, to
shape the meaning of those ends.
95. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
96. See id. at 416.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
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The legislative act at issue in McCulloch illustrates that point. The
Constitution makes no mention of the power to establish a bank, yet
Marshall found that Congress might charter a bank so long as it is a means
appropriate to a legitimate constitutional end. What end was that? In
deciding the issue, Marshall speaks of the Bank as an "essential instrument
in the prosecution of its fiscal operations."" Earlier, he explained that the
Bank promoted the "great powers" of taxation, government borrowing,
regulating commerce, and providing for the national defense. While the
Bank could not be seen as strictly necessary to any one power, it was
conducive to the pursuit of any of those objects. As such, the Court
sustained the constitutionality of the Bank.
Marshall's contemporaries recognized McCulloch's significance, yet it
was not on its face a radical decision. The authoritative construction of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the language that would be indelibly
associated with McCulloch, dated back fourteen years to one of Marshall's
early decisions, United States v. Fisher.1° Just three years earlier, Justice
Story had applied the same reasoning in reviewing Congress's power to
grant the Supreme Court appellate review over cases in state courts in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee."' In that case, Justice Story recognized, "The
constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the
purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to
provide for minute specifications of its powers, or declare the means by
which those powers should be carried into execution." " As such, the
Constitution leaves it to the legislature, "from time to time, to adopt its own
means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise
of its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should
require."'0 3 Prior to McCulloch, the Marshall Court had understood
Congress to have wide discretion in interpreting its enumerated powers.
Nevertheless, McCulloch involved not simply general principles, but
also the Court's recognition of the constitutionality of the Bank of the
United States, one of the most contentious issues of the era.'"' In this
respect, Marshall's contemporaries immediately recognized the importance
of the decision, which was reprinted throughout the country."eS Although
the Bank lay at the center of the debate, many critics focused on Marshall's
99. Id. at 422.
100. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) (*Congress must possess the choice of means, and
must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power
granted by the constitution.").
101. 14U.S. (1 Wheat-) 304(1816).
102. Id. at 326.
103. Id. at 326-27.
104. See I WARREN, supra note 88, at 503.
105. See id& at 511. For more on contemporary reactions, see id. at 511-24.
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broad language, arguing that it granted Congress an unlimited license to
trespass on the rights of the states, free from judicial scrutiny."°
McCulloch soon became the authoritative interpretation of
congressional power. The most influential treatises of the era relied upon
McCulloch's interpretation of the scope of congressional power. Justice
Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, which
would be quoted time and again during the Reconstruction debates,
emphasized the Court's obligation to recognize the broad discretion
Congress enjoyed in relating means to ends.'7 As Story explained, "Where
the power is granted in general terms, the power is to be construed, as co-
extensive with the terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible
from the context." 108 Story quoted McCulloch to explain how a court
should read the boundaries of powers under the Constitution:
[C]ongress must have a wide discretion as to the choice of means;
and the only limitation upon the discretion would seem to be, that
the means are appropriate to the end. And this must admit of
considerable latitude; for the relation between the action and the
end.., is not always so direct and palpable as to strike the eye of
every observer."9
Likewise, Chancellor Kent, in his 1826 treatise, Commentaries on
American Law, included a lengthy description of Marshall's reasoning in a
chapter entitled "Of Judicial Constructions of the Power of Congress." I "
The Supreme Court applied the McCulloch reasoning in upholding
congressional discretion throughout the antebellum era. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,"' the Court granted Congress wide latitude in regulating intrastate
navigation under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Coombs,"2 the
Court similarly sustained an act of Congress punishing crimes outside U.S.
106. Spencer Roane described McCulloch as a' judicial coup de main" that granted Congress
"a general letter of attorney .... There is no earthly difference between an unlimited grant of
power, and a grant limited in its terms, but accompanied with unlimited means of carrying it into
execution." Spencer Roane, Hampden No. I, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 1819, reprinted in JOHN
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 89, at 107, 110; see also Letter
from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in JAMES MADISON'S "ADVICE TO MY
COUNTRY" 34, 34 (David B. Mattem ed., 1997) (finding McCulloch to "substitute for a definite
connection between means and ends, a Legislative discretion as to the former to which no
practical limit can be assigned").
107. Story's Commentaries were cited numerous times in the congressional debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1093 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Bingham); id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
108. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 407
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
109. Id. at417.
110. See JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 236-39 (Legal Classics Library
1986) (1826).
111. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
112. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838).
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territorial waters on the grounds that it fell within Congress's power to
regulate foreign commerce. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,"3 Justice Story found
that Congress's implied powers extended to passing laws appropriate to
enforcing the Fugitive Slave Clause even though the Clause itself granted
no express power to Congress."4 Likewise, Chief Justice Taney, hardly a
nationalist, continued McCulloch's broad reading of legislative discretion,
sustaining the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in
Ableman v. Booth."5
Taney's majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,"6 the only case in
which the Court struck down an act of Congress during the antebellum era,
notably made no reference to Congress's powers under McCulloch. In that
case, a majority of the Court found that Congress's power to regulate the
territories did not extend to prohibiting slavery under the Missouri
Compromise. McCulloch did appear, however, in the dissenting opinion of
Justice McLean, who took issue with the majority's description of
congressional power as "delegated and restricted." '  Instead, Justice
McLean argued that the Court must construe Congress's power to make all
"needful regulations" concerning the territories under the standard set by
McCulloch."' McLean quoted the McCulloch standard and concluded that,
should Congress decide that prohibiting slavery from a territory would raise
the value of public lands or be conducive to "any other ground connected
with the public interest," then the Court should recognize Congress's
discretion." 9
Despite Dred Scott, courts and commentators continued to read
McCulloch as the standard by which courts should evaluate the propriety of
113. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
114. See id. at 615 ("If, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right ... the natural inference
certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to
enforce it."). Throughout the Reconstruction debates, a number of Republicans seized on Prigg's
notion of implied powers to argue that the Bill of Rights. the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2, and later the Citizenship Clause of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
gave Congress the implied powers to pass direct legislation to protect the freed slaves. See. e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (arguing for implied
congressional power to enforce the Bill of Rights); CURTIS, supra note 1. at 81. 159 (describing
the congressional debates over Prigg); see also The Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3.49-50 (1883)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing for implied congressional power to reach private discrimination
under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
115. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); see also JOHN NORTON POMEROY. AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 170-71 (New York. Hurd & Houghton
1870) (arguing that McCulloch's "liberal and high national views" had not been "abandoned, or
in the least degree modified, in later times when the court has been composed of other judges
under the leadership of C. J. Taney"). Of course, one might also read Ablenwn's endorsement of
national power to reflect Taney's support for the legality of slavery. See infra text accompanying
notes 116-119 (discussing McCulloch's absence from Dred Scott).
116. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
117. Id. at 446.
118. Id. at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 543.
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an act of Congress. In the 1860s, courts continued to cite it as the
authoritative definition of the scope of national power, 2' and noted treatises
likewise relied upon the Chief Justice's language in McCulloch.2' In
United States v. Rhodes,122 Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, sustained the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 through a detailed reading of the judicial
precedents that had developed since McCulloch. The Justice recognized that
Congress's power to pass "appropriate" legislation under the Thirteenth
Amendment reflected "a phrase which had been enlightened by well-
considered judicial application." 123 After quoting the McCulloch standard,
the Justice examined the kinds of acts that the Supreme Court had
recognized as appropriate to Congress's enumerated powers: the taxing
power, the Commerce Clause, the power to establish post offices, and to
raise and support armies and navies. For Justice Swayne, the lesson of these
cases was that " [a]ny exercise of legislative power within its limits involves
a legislative, and not a judicial question. It is only when the authority given
has been clearly exceeded, that the judicial power can be invoked." 124
Relying upon McCulloch, Justice Swayne found that the court
"entertain[ed] no doubt of the constitutionality of the act in all its
provisions." '25 The Civil Rights Act fell within Congress's appropriate
powers under the Thirteenth Amendment. 6
As Rhodes reveals, at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, courts and commentators recognized McCulloch as the
standard by which judges should review the constitutionality of an act of
Congress. Moreover, they recognized that under such a standard, courts
should invalidate legislative acts only if they could not be reconciled with
any enumerated power. Such an understanding reached almost universal
acceptance in the federal judiciary, and it was the broad McCulloch
standard that would inform the drafting and the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Marks, 26 F. Cas. 1162, 1163 (C.C.D. Ky. 1869) (No. 15,721)
(finding that "it is now universally admitted that.., if the end be legitimate, all the means which
are appropriate and adapted to the end are likewise legitimate, and may be applied and used by
congress in their discretion"); United States v. Fairchilds, 25 F. Cas. 1035, 1036 (W.D. Mich.
1867) (No. 15,067); Latham's Case, I Ct. CI. 149 (1864), available in 1864 WL 2250. at *9.
121. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 63-64
(Da Capo Press 1972) (1868); POMEROY, supra note 115, at 165-71. For a discussion of the
influence of these two commentators in the 1860s, see Aynes, supra note 42, at 89-94.
122. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
123. Id. at 793.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 794.
126. Justice Swayne notably reserved the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment
would grant Congress the right to confer political rights. See id. at 794.
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B. McCulloch and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
The McCulloch theory of legislative power was on the minds of
opponents and supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the Framers
borrowed Marshall's words, they borrowed from the tradition of legislative
discretion that courts had recognized under this standard. The same
Congress had exercised that discretion in legislating under the Enforcement
Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. In debating both Bingham's original
version and his final draft, Republicans and Democrats alike spoke of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle of congressional power that would
provide Congress with the power to legislate when, in its discretion, states
threatened civil liberties.
Republicans relied upon the Thirteenth Amendment to grant Congress
the power to protect the civil liberties of its citizens under the Civil Rights
Act. The Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment had recognized that
Congress would enjoy the discretion to construe the amendment broadly in
enacting legislation under its Enforcement Clause." Immediately following
the Secretary of State's declaration that the Thirteenth Amendment had
been ratified, Republicans pushed Congress to employ that discretion to
protect the civil rights of the freedmen.'2 In so doing, Congressmen
expressly invoked McCulloch as a guide to understanding the scope of
congressional power."n Speaking on the House floor, Representative
Wilson quoted the McCulloch standard and then applied it to the Civil
Rights Act:
Who will say that the means provided by this... bill are not
appropriate for the enforcement of the power delegated to Congress
by the second section of the amendment abolishing slavery, which I
have quoted? The end is legitimate, because it is defined by the
Constitution itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom to the
citizen.... A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill
cannot be reduced to slavery. Anything which protects him in the
possession of these rights insures him against reduction to slavery.
127. See TENBROEK, supra note 44, at 144-51 (arguing that supporters and opponents in
Congress adopted a broad interpretation of congressional power under the Thirteenth
Amendment).
128. The day after the Secretary's message, Senator Trumbull announced that he would
present drafts of what would become the Civil Rights Bill and the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. See
CHARLES FAIMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-68. at 1161-62 (Vol. VI of Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court (Paul A. Freund ed.. 1971)).
129. The Republican interpretation did not catch the Democrats by surprise. Representative
Holman, an Indiana Democrat, believed that the appropriate legislation might include granting the
freedmen citizenship rights. See CONG. GLoBE. 38th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2962 (1864). But see
FARMAN, supra note 128, at 1156-59 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment would not have
been ratified if such a construction was expected).
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This settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that settles its
constitutionality. 3 '
Wilson read the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment to be the
"maintenance of freedom to the citizen," and any measures that Congress
took to protect the liberty of the citizen fell within the appropriate scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment.
Senator Trumbull likewise read the Enforcement Clause to grant
Congress the power to "pass any law which, in our judgment, is deemed
appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom to
all people in the United States." 131 The relevant question, said another
legislator, was whether the rights protected by the act "can be said to come
within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in innumerable cases, that
in order to entitle this Government to assume a power as an implied power
of this Government it 'must appear that it is appropriate and plainly adapted
to the end."' 132 Representative Cook followed that guide in interpreting the
meaning of "appropriate":
When Congress was clothed with power to enforce that provision
by appropriate legislation, it meant two things. It meant, first, that
Congress shall have power to secure the rights of freemen to those
men who had been slaves. It meant, secondly, that Congress should
be the judge of what is necessary for the purpose of securing to
them those rights.'33
Cook, like Justice Swayne and many other Republicans,"34 read the
Thirteenth Amendment not as a narrow prohibition against legal slavery,
but as granting Congress the "power to secure the rights of freemen to
those men who had been slaves." Such a reading followed McCulloch,
which directed legislators and judges to remember that a Constitution marks
out only the "great outlines" of powers. Legislators and judges recognized
Congress's right to define quite broadly the ends of its powers, and the
means appropriate to those ends.
Representative Thayer's recognition that Congress had the sole power
to judge the "necessity" of an action taken pursuant to its power also arises
directly out of McCulloch.'35 Such an idea was to recur throughout the
130. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866).
131. Id. at 475.
132. Id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (quoting STORY, supra note 108, at 416).
133. Id. at 1124.
134. Like Justice Swayne, Chief Justice Chase also recognized the Civil Rights Act to fall
within Congress's power under the Thirteenth Amendment. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339
(C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
135. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) ("[Wlhere the law is
not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to
[Vol. 109: 115
The McCulloch Theory
debates. Another congressman read McCulloch for the proposition that "[i]f
a certain means to carry into effect any of the powers expressly given by the
Constitution to the Government of the Union be an appropriate measure,
not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of necessity is a question of
legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance."' The judicial role
extends to assuring that Congress pursues an end appropriate to the national
government. When such an end falls within those "great outlines" of the
constitutional text, it is not for judges to inquire into how necessary such a
measure is to that end.
The Republicans who passed the Civil Rights Act brought that same
understanding to the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Howard, in
introducing the revised version of the amendment to the Senate, found that
the courts had hitherto been unable to describe all of the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the United States. The Senator recognized that
judges had attempted to define such rights, most notably in Justice Bushrod
Washinoton's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.'37  However, Howard
suggested it would be a "somewhat barren discussion" to try to describe
them, for they "are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature."' 138 The supporters of the amendment expressed little
concern over these ambiguities since under McCulloch they did not have to
answer the question. The text of the amendment provided the principle that
later Congresses would have the power to protect. Under McCulloch,
Congress would enjoy the discretion to supply content to those "broad
outlines" marked by the amendment.
39
undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.").
136. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
137. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). For the influence of Corfield, see AMAR,
supra note 1, at 176-78.
138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Contemporary scholars have provided
alternative explanations for such deliberate ambiguity. William Nelson suggests that the
Republicans regarded the issue primarily at the level of political principle. Section I sought to
entrench in the Constitution the North's victory in the Civil War, not a specific set of rights. See
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE 61 (1988). Raoul Berger suggests, but rejects, the idea that the Republicans hoped by
vagueness to obscure the radicalism of the amendment from its ratifiers. See BERGER. supra note
42, at 99-116.
139. The congressional debates suggest that the Framers understood congressional power
under Section 5 to go beyond the "ratchet theory" described by Justice Brennan in Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). Congress has no power to reduce the level of
constitutional protection recognized by the judiciary. Indeed, the Framers enlisted the judiciary in
order to ensure that the Civil Rights Act might survive a hostile Congress. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. However, the Framers did not believe that congressional power was limited to
enhancing the protection of rights recognized by the judiciary. Just as Congress might define the
"badges and incidents of slavery" under the Thirteenth Amendment, they had discretion in
defining the privileges and immunities protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. For a
discussion of the Boerne Court's interpretation of the ratchet, see Buss, supra note 34, at 422-32.
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The opponents of the amendment shared this understanding and feared
congressional discretion. The Democrats invoked the precedent of the
Thirteenth Amendment. As one predicted, "We know what the result of this
will be, for we have already seen it tested." 140 Another suggested, "When
these words were used in the amendment abolishing slavery they were
thought to be harmless, but during this session there has been claimed for
them such force and scope of meaning as that Congress might invade the
jurisdiction of the States .... As construed this provision is most
dangerous." 141 Under such a reading, the amendment would grant Congress
the power to "strike down those State rights and invest all power in the
General Government." 142 As such, the amendment was "most dangerous to
liberty. It saps the foundation of the Government; it destroys the elementary
principles of the States; it consolidates everything into one imperial
despotism." 143 While Democrats may have exaggerated those fears, the
concerns reflected Congress's past construction of its power under the
Thirteenth Amendment.
During the national ratification debate, Democrats throughout the states
feared the broad power that Congress would enjoy under the Fourteenth
Amendment. James E. Bond, in his recent study of eleven Southern states,
notes that "those who attacked Section I focused on Congress's Section 5
power to define and enforce the privileges and immunities of
citizenship."' 44Southern legislatures recognized that the "failure to define
privileges and immunities necessarily left to Congress that power under
Section 5." "' In state after state, Southern politicians expressed the belief
that Congress's power to pass "appropriate legislation" left the content of
Section 1 subject to the construction of future Congresses. 46 In those states,
the supporters of the amendment did not deny Congress's power over civil
rights; instead, they emphasized that the national legislature already
140. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3147 (1866) (statement of Rep. Harding).
141. Id. at 2940 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
142. Id. at 2500 (statement of Rep. Shanklin).
143. Id. at 2538 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
144. JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM 254-55 (1997).
145. Id. at 38 (citing William Sharkey, JACKSON CLARION, Sept. 28, 1866); see also id. at
104 ("The principal concern that white Alabamians expressed about Section 1 was Congress's
power under Section 5 to define the privileges and immunities of citizenship.").
146. See id. at 217 ("What is 'appropriate legislation?' The Constitution is silent; therefore, it
is left for the Congress to determine." (quoting JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS, 11th Legis., 421-22)); see also id. at 238 ("It will be contended that [members of
Congress] are the proper judges of what constitutes appropriate legislation. If therefore, the
amendment be adopted, and a fractional Congress ... be empowered 'to enforce it by appropriate
legislation,' what vestige of hope remains to the people of those States?" (quoting Governor
Jenkins of Georgia)); id. at 34 (Mississippi); id. at 56-57 (North Carolina); id. at 87 (Louisiana);
id. at 104 (Alabama); id. at 126-27 (South Carolina); id. at 148-51 (Virginia); id. at 173-74
(Florida); id. at 192-93 (Arkansas); id. at 236-38 (Georgia).
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possessed such power-as evidenced by the Civil Rights Act.' That
Democrats feared Congress's discretion more than the text of Section I is
reflected in a compromise proposal, reportedly drafted by President
Johnson and several Southern governors, that left Section 1 largely intact
but removed Section 5.1' The Southern ratification debates recognized that
Congress would enjoy broad discretion to legislate under its own
understanding of Section 1.
The Northern debates were somewhat more circumspect in describing
Congress's power. Republicans sought to downplay the, openness of the
amendment, insisting that it would not wreak a fundamental change in the
federalist system. The amendment extended only to those rights that states
had no power, under the Constitution or natural law, to abridge in the first
place.' 49 A state that guaranteed those rights had nothing to fear from the
national legislature, which could be trusted to respect states' rights.
Republicans generally agreed that the new amendment did not grant
suffrage to blacks, a point that angered radicals but that many Republicans
saw as necessary to secure ratification.so Some claimed, not always
convincingly, that the amendment did nothing more than give Congress the
power to ensure equal treatment in the enjoyment of state-created rights.''
This minimalist talk was problematic, however. Republicans, like their
opponents, embraced a theory of legislative discretion that provided no
ready boundaries to such a broad grant of congressional power. Even if the
amendment might be construed on an equal-treatment principle, it need not
be so construed. And under McCulloch, Congress would have the discretion
to adopt either plausible interpretation. The Reconstruction Court would
take it upon itself to narrow the amendment, indeed to read the Privileges or
Immunities Clause out of the amendment. Such a move was unexpected,
although perhaps to Republican eyes, not unprecedented. 5- As the next
section shows, the Reconstruction Court did this while still embracing the
McCulloch reading of congressional power, and indeed, it did so precisely
because it viewed Congress's power under Section 5 in McCulloch, rather
than in Boerne, terms.
147. See, e.g., id. at 78 (quoting NEW ORLEANS TRIBUNE, Mar. 18. 1866); id. at 123 (quoting
LANcASTER LEDGER (South Carolina), Oct. 31, 1866).
148. See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATTFiCATION OF THE FOURTEINrrH AMENDMENr 139-42
(1984).
149. See CURTnS, supra note 1, at 145; JAMES, supra note 148, at 42-44; NELSON, supra note
138, at 120-21.
150. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 138, at 126-27.
151. See i at 121-22.
152. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3038 (1866) (statement of Sen. Yates)
(describing the Fourteenth Amendment as "a guarantee which protects us from future judicial
tyranny such as we have experienced under the decisions of the Supreme Court"); id. at 1062
(statement of Rep. Kelley); sources cited supra note 47.
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C. The Fourteenth Amendment Before the Reconstruction Court
The Reconstruction Court is not widely known for its expansive
reading of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. In such
famous decisions as the Slaughter-House Cases'53 and the Civil Rights
Cases,154 the Court narrowed the scope of the liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and struck down acts of Congress enacted to
protect civil liberties. On the other hand, the Court's visible struggle with
the meaning of the amendment-its appreciation of the threat to the
existing federalist balance-demonstrated a broad understanding of the
scope of congressional power. The Court recognized the Fourteenth
Amendment to be an express grant of power to Congress, and it understood
Congress to have wide discretion in passing laws pursuant to recognized
constitutional ends. The conservative Court found itself drawn to narrowing
the ends covered by the Fourteenth Amendment precisely because it felt
obliged to defer to Congress's interpretation of the scope of those ends.
The Reconstruction Court embraced McCulloch as setting out "the
fullest consideration" of the extent of Congress's powers, a case that
adopted a construction "that has ever since been accepted as determining its
true meaning" and "is familiar to the legal profession, and, indeed, to the
whole country." ' In 1870, the Court described this conception in the Legal
Tender Cases,'56 a set of cases that considered the constitutionality of Civil
War acts that had declared paper money equivalent to coins for the payment
of debts. In 1869, a divided Court in Hepburn v. Griswold'57 struck down
the Legal Tender Acts for exceeding Congress's enumerated powers. A
year later, the Court, still divided, reversed itself and sustained the
constitutionality of the acts. 58 The majority and dissenting opinions in both
cases framed the issue through the lens of McCulloch 59 Did the power to
declare notes legal tender fall within the scope of an enumerated power of
153. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
154. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
155. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 538 (1870); see also Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 45 (1867) (describing the McCulloch decision as "one every way
important, and ... familiar to the statesman and the constitutional lawyer").
156. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457.
157. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
158. The Hepburn Court, which had only eight justices, divided five to three. After President
Johnson's tenure, Congress provided for the appointment of nine justices. See An Act to Amend
the Judicial System of the United States, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44 (1869). Although the act was passed
prior to Hepburn, it took effect a month later in December 1869. Justice Grier resigned from the
bench in February 1870, and as a result, two new justices, Strong and Bradley, were appointed.
The Legal Tender Cases were decided by a margin of five to four.
159. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 614-15 (quoting McCulloch language); id. at 631 (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (discussing McCulloch); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 532 (same); id. at 570 (Chase,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch). Justice Bradley also discussed McCulloch in his concurring
opinion in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 568.
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Congress? The dispute between the two sides was not over whether to
accept the McCulloch approach, but over the level of generality to ascribe
to the designated objects of the Constitution.' 60
These opinions on federal power prove enlightening when read against
their authors' future views in Slaughter-House and Ex parte Virginia. The
majority opinion in Hepburn, written by Chief Justice Chase, found that the
legal tender acts could not be fairly implied from any of Congress's
enumerated powers.16 1 Justice Miller, who would write the majority opinion
in Slaughter-House, disagreed with that reading. In his Hepburn dissent, he
endorsed the broad reading of McCulloch, arguing that "if we adopt the
construction of Chief Justice Marshall ... which has never to this day been
overruled or questioned," then the Court must conclude that the legal
tender acts were "conduc[ive] towards the purpose of borrowing money, of
paying debts, of raising armies, of suppressing insurrection." '6 And as the
acts were "conducive" to those broad purposes, the Court must find them
within the choice of means available to Congress. Justice Miller's broad
construction of constitutional ends in Hepburn presages his fear in
Slaughter-House of permitting Congress to regulate civil rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A year later, the Court provided an extensive analysis of McCulloch in
adopting the dissenters' view in the Legal Tender Cases. Justice Strong
drafted the majority opinion, and it was he who would apply this
understanding in evaluating Congress's Section 5 powers in Ex parte
Virginia. After recognizing the serious consequences of holding the acts
unconstitutional, the Court explained the presumption of constitutionality
that had long governed its review of legislative acts. "It is incumbent,
therefore, upon those who affirm the unconstitutionality of an act of
Congress to show clearly that it is in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution. It is not sufficient for them that they succeed in raising a
doubt."' 6 The Court would require clear evidence of congressional
overreaching before it would overturn a duly enacted law. Justice Strong
wrote that McCulloch reminded the judiciary that the Constitution speaks
not in "minute details," but "prescribes outlines, leaving the filling up to
be deduced from the outlines."' 6 In defining constitutional powers, the
Court must defer to Congress's discretion in passing measures conducive to
160. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 539 ("Even in Hepburn v. Grimwold, both the
majority and minority of the court concurred in accepting the doctrines of McCulloch v. Maryland
as sound expositions of the Constitution, though disagreeing in their application.").
161. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 616-17. Just two years earlier, the Chief Justice, sitting on
circuit, had sustained the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth
Amendment. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
162. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 635 (Miller, J., dissenting).
163. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 531.
164. Id. at 532.
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those purposes, "subject only to the restrictions that they be not prohibited,
and be necessary and proper... ." 165 The McCulloch standard, which "has
ever since been accepted as determining" the scope of congressional power,
"also marks out with admirable precision the province of this court," which
Justice Strong defined as follows:
Before we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we must
be convinced they were not appropriate means, or means conducive
to the execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the
government, not appropriate in any degree (for we are not judges of
the degree of appropriateness), or we must hold that they were
prohibited.'66
So long as the act is "appropriate in any degree," "conducive to the
execution" of a legitimate constitutional end (read broadly), and not
expressly prohibited, the act lies within the discretion of Congress. Against
such a broad standard, Justice Strong found that the legal tender acts were
constitutional.
Three years later in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court
approached the Fourteenth Amendment with this understanding in mind.
The case arose out of a Louisiana state law that granted a monopoly to a
slaughterhouse corporation, restricting all slaughtering of animals in New
Orleans to the stockyards of the corporation. A group of butchers
challenged the statute in part on the ground that it violated their
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 A majority of the
Court rejected the butchers' claim on the basis that the butchers did not
show the violation of a right protected by the amendment. The amendment
protected the "privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United
States," yet these were distinct from the "privileges and immunities of the
citizen of the States." 68 The Framers' decision to employ the former
language rather than the latter, which arose from Article IV, Section 2,
indicated an intent to protect only peculiarly federal civil rights, and not the
more familiar panoply of civil rights. As the dissenting judges pointed out,
this surprising reading of original intent ran contrary to the expressed
statements of the Framers of that amendment who relied upon Justice
Washington's famous definition in Corfield v. Coryell in drafting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.169
165. Id. at 534.
166. Id. at 538-39.
167. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
168. Id. at 74.
169. See id. at 98 (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing the congressional debates' understanding
of privileges and immunities); id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] defeats, by a
limitation not anticipated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed and of those by
whom it was adopted.").
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The Slaughter-House majority was conscious of its twisted reading of
that history but found itself compelled to reach such a conclusion by
considering the consequences of the alternative. The Court recognized that
the argument "is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the
consequences... of a particular construction of an instrument." '
However, to read the Fourteenth Amendment to allow Congress to protect
civil liberties against the states would "fetter and degrade the State
governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress" and "radically
change[] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other. ,, 171 In the face of such consequences, the
Court found itself obliged to construe the language as narrowly as possible.
Although Slaughter-House did not involve an act of Congress, the
Court was most concerned about the effect its decision would have upon the
scope of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
defining the threat of a broad reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, the majority opinion found:
[W]here it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce
that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress
the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to
the States?
All this and more must follow, if the [broad reading] be sound.
For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress
whenever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged
by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance,
limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the
States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment
it may think proper on all such subjects."
The Court's primary concern with allowing the amendment to incorporate
civil rights was that it would permit Congress to legislate "whenever in its
discretion" any of those rights are " supposed" to be abridged. The majority
opinion emphasized Congress's independent authority to legislate
according to its own understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Should it admit that the clause comprised those "fundamental" rights that,
in Justice Washington's words, "belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments,"1 7 3 then it would have to accept Congress's freedom to
legislate according to its own understanding of those terms. In order to
170. Id. at 78.
171. Id. For a sympathetic modem reading, see I BRUCE ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 95-96 (1991), which discusses the difficulty in integrating the Civil War
amendments into the original federalist structure.
172. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 77-78 (emphasis added).
173. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (defining
"Privileges and Immunities" in Article IV).
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avoid the consolidation of power that would follow, the majority on the
Slaughter-House Court found themselves obliged to read civil liberties right
out of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 174
Although Slaughter-House redefined the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Reconstruction Court retained its broad reading of congressional power
under the amendment. In Ex parte Virginia, 75 the Court sustained a
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that criminalized the exclusion of
persons from jury service on account of race. In so doing, it recognized the
amendment to be a grant of power to Congress and applied the McCulloch
standard in reviewing legislative action. The Court emphasized that the text
gave the federal judiciary no explicit power to void state action, and,
"[w]ere it not for the fifth section of that amendment, there might be room
for argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of
the State." 176 It was from that section that "the amendments derive much of
their force," 177 and under it Congress must enjoy the discretion provided by
McCulloch:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all
persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.,
78
Within the narrowed confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
recognized that Congress retained substantial latitude to pursue its ends.
The Reconstruction Court of the 1870s thus endorsed the McCulloch
understanding of congressional power. Although the justices did not always
agree upon its application, the Court consistently demonstrated its
customary deference to Congress's assertion of its power. Congress had the
power to pass all laws, not expressly prohibited, that were plainly adapted
to a legitimate constitutional end. Slaughter-House excluded civil rights
from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to prevent Congress
from exercising such discretion. The Court's jurisprudence demonstrates
how the amendment's Framers, as well as other lawyers of the era,
understood the McCulloch theory, even though its specific holdings
undermined the ends the Republicans pursued.
174. Of the three dissenters, only Justice Swayne confronted the majority's concern for broad
McCulloch powers. He recognized that "the power conferred is novel and large," yet argued that
such powers were precisely in line with "the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed
and of those by whom it was adopted." Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
175. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
176. Id. at 347.
177. Id. at 345.
178. Id. at 345-46.
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The Court's concern for the federal balance would soon lead away from
the McCulloch theory of congressional power. The decline of the
McCulloch theory in the Lochner era" 9 is not the subject of this Note, but it
is worth acknowledging in passing the Civil War amendments' influence
upon the rise of the judicial imperialism of that era."s° In the Civil Rights
Cases, decided in 1883, the Court denied Congress the latitude to define the
"badges and incidents of slavery" under the Thirteenth Amendment. 8' The
Court, with a view of congressional discretion more akin to Boerne than to
Slaughter-House, rejected Congress's attempt to proscribe private
discrimination in places of public accommodation. The majority did not
consider whether the federal act was a plausible attempt to further
emancipation; instead, it defined the amendment narrowly and struck down
the applicable provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 187 L."
Alone in dissent was Justice Harlan, who recognized that the majority's
opinion "abandoned" the "rule of construction" laid out in McCulloch."3
Justice Harlan, quoting the McCulloch language, noted that "[t]his court
has always given a broad and liberal construction to the Constitution, so as
to enable Congress, by legislation, to enforce rights secured by that
instrument."8' Harlan invoked such antebellum opinions as Prigg and
Ableman that had recognized significant congressional discretion in
enforcing the federal rights of slave masters. He demanded that the Court
give the same reading to the amendment that emancipated the slaves.
Harlan thus found that under the legislature's "express power to enforce
that amendment, by appropriate legislation," Congress "may enact laws to
179. So named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Although Lochner struck down
a state regulation as inconsistent with the Due Process Clause, the Lochner Court demonstrated
similar aggressiveness in constraining congressional interpretation of its power under the
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (rejecting Congress's
power to proscribe the interstate traffic of goods produced by child labor); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (rejecting Congress's power to regulate a monopoly on
manufacturing under the Sherman Act).
180. The strong relationship between the Civil War amendments and the rise of the Lochner
Court requires further exploration. Not only is the substantive liberty of contract rooted in free
labor concerns, see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, the shift in the Court's mode of judicial review-the decline
of McCulloch and the rise of "judicial imperialism" -is rooted in part in the Court's attempt to
protect the federalist balance from the Civil War amendments, cf. 2 BRUCE ACKERAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (describing Lochner and Slaughter-House as attempts to
synthesize the concerns of the founding and Reconstruction eras for federalism and individual
rights).
181. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases also
rejected Congress's ability to reach private discrimination under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For a discussion of the debate over the "state action" doctrine, see supra note 70.
That debate poses a major interpretive question that even under a McCulloch reading of the
amendment would seem fit for judicial determination.
182. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 21-22.
183. Id. at 51 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at50-51.
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protect that people against the deprivation, because of their race, of any
civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State .... ,' Harlan
invoked the broad reading of ends, and the allowance for Congress's
plausible attempts to achieve those ends, that had been characteristic of
judicial review earlier in the nineteenth century. The dissent thus remained
faithful to the McCulloch origins of the amendment, even as the majority
backed away from that understanding of judicial review.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has described the theory of judicial review that was
understood by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment--one sharply at
odds with the Court's holding in City of Boerne v. Flores. Instead of
embracing a rather formalist separation between Congress's power to
"enforce" and to "define" the amendment, the Framers expected that
Congress would have the discretion to pass acts that arguably fell within the
broad guarantees of the amendment. The Framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment, who would soon draft the Fourteenth, were not concerned
about whether a court would find that the self-executing prohibition against
slavery implied an end to state violations of civil liberties. They instead
focused upon their power to pass such legislation as appropriate to the ends
of the amendment. And it was under the deferential McCulloch line that
they understood the act to fall within their power.
Had the Supreme Court approached Boerne through McCulloch, there
is little doubt that it would have sustained the constitutionality of RFRA.
McCulloch recognized that the Constitution delineated only the broad
outlines of its enumerated powers, yet the Boerne Court struck down a law
according to five Justices' particular conception of the acknowledged free
exercise right. McCulloch accorded Congress liberal discretion in
legislating under its powers, yet the Court found that Congress had no
discretion to depart from the judicial construction of the amendment.
Finally, McCulloch recognized that a court should strike down a
congressional act only when it cannot be reconciled with the constitutional
text, yet the Court struck down RFRA even though four of nine Justices in
Employment Division v. Smith'8 6 had shared Congress's interpretation of
religious liberty. Had Boerne taken McCulloch seriously, it would have
been a much easier case.
McCulloch challenges Boerne's dichotomy between "substantive" and
"remedial" powers. For the Boerne Court, Congress either was bound by
the pronouncements of the judiciary or had plenary power to write the
185. Id. at 36.
186. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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constitutional text. McCulloch suggests that this was a false choice. The
Court in Employment Division v. Smith had to interpret a self-executing
provision of the constitutional text. The Boerne Court had to determine
whether an act of Congress was appropriate to the legislative power
enumerated in the text. These tasks surely are related, but they are distinct
nonetheless. The judiciary's determination of the most compelling meaning
of the constitutional text does not define the universe of what may be
appropriate measures under that text. And the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood the outer perimeter of what is appropriate in terms
of McCulloch.
The primary purpose of this Note, however, has not been to defend the
merits of RFRA as such. Instead, the purpose has been to call into question
a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's history that would deny the
national legislature the power to participate in articulating our national civil
liberties. The Reconstruction Congress drafted an amendment that would
grant Congress the power to protect rights that "are not and cannot be fully
defined in their entire extent and precise nature." ' The drafters recognized
that subsequent Congresses would have the discretion to legislate according
to alternative meanings of the text. So they amended the text to enlist the
courts, not in fear of congressional overreaching, but to ensure that the
judicial branch of government would secure liberties should Congress fail
to do so.
The Fourteenth Amendment thus relies upon both Congress and the
courts to protect civil liberty. These two institutions need not always agree.
Indeed, as others have noted, the distinct institutional perspectives of these
branches may lead them to different conclusions over the guarantees in
Section 1 of the amendment."'8 However, the Framers designed the
amendment so as to ensure that when the branches do disagree, it would be
the most expansive understanding of liberty that triumphs. The McCulloch
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment thus should be preferred not simply
because it better fits the original understanding of the amendment, but
because it enlists the legislative branch's institutional competence in the
service of both liberty and democracy.
The Supreme Court has played a noble but not uncontroversial role in
applying the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment during the twentieth
century. The "counter-majoritarian difficulty" has plagued every effort to
187. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
188. See, e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently. Boerme v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 31. 59 (recognizing
"important institutional differences" that would lead Congress and courts to different
interpretations of the amendment); McConnell, supra note 34. at 185 (" (I]t must be understood it
must be understood that differences in interpretation between judicial and legislative bodies are
not solely a product of intellectual disagreement (let alone pretext), but are a natural and
predictable result of institutional differences.").
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
expand the scope of national civil rights.' 89 In recent years, the Court has
shied away from discovering new rights that lack firm roots in our historical
traditions.'9" However, arguments against judges creating these rights lose
much of their force when it is the national legislature that gives birth to
them. The Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress the discretion to
debate and reach consensus on those civil liberties worthy of national
protection. An amendment that provides such an avenue for political
activism furthers both democracy and liberty, and it is an avenue that the
Boerne opinion would seem to foreclose.
The Supreme Court has revived principles of federalism that had
perhaps been neglected as a result of the achievements of the modern Court.
United States v. Lopez, in particular, emphasizes that there remain spheres
of local activity that the broad powers of the national government cannot
reach. 19' Even so, we must be sensitive to those objects that the people of
the United States, by constitutional amendment, have entrusted to their
representatives in the national legislature. The Fourteenth Amendment, as
its history reveals, did precisely that. In the broad guarantees of that text,
the Framers ensured that their successors would have the power to
deliberate and to protect, as a nation, those civil liberties that they held most
dear.
189. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (positing the
tension between democracy and judicial review as the fundamental problem of modem
constitutional theory).
190. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting the right to
physician-assisted suicide); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting the right to
homosexual sodomy).
191. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones
Act to exceed congressional power).
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